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and by homeowners to maintain their lawns 
and yards ... people have become convinced 
that using any type of herbicide in forestry 
poses an unacceptable threat to the environ- 
ment and to public health."(128-9) Highlight- 
ing contradictions such as these greatly 
strengthens his case for a reassessment of the 
public's attitude toward forest management. 
In many ways, this book provides a rela- 
tively well-balanced evaluation of the subject 
under consideration. For example, although 
Kimmins is critical of the purely emotional 
stand taken by many, he also condemns the 
manner in which industrialists and govern- 
ments have managed Canada's forests. As he 
states, "[d]ecisions in Canadian forestry in the 
past have too often been based predominantly 
on economic criteria. Negative impacts on the 
environment or on communities were often 
ignored or given little attention." (70) This 
criticism is echoed in his account of the forest 
industry's poor record regarding road build- 
ing in the bush (84) and the size of its clear 
cuts. (79-84) 
In stressing the need for logical discourse 
in this debate, however, Kimrnins has a predi- 
lection to be too rational. His chapter on the 
need to accept the extinction of certain species 
demonstrates his tendency to diminish the 
"irrational," ethical questions regarding this 
subject in favour of focusing on the scientific 
considerations. Kimmins is unconvincing in 
his attempt to illustrate his point in this sec- 
tion, stating that "many species can be lost 
from an ecosystem without the ecosystem 
'falling apart at the hinges,' just as many spe- 
cialty stores can close without a major effect 
on the ability of a human community to func- 
tion." (164) Not only does this analogy not 
work, but Kimmins also blurs the distinction 
between an ecosystem's "natural" evolution 
in the distant past and the changes which are 
brought about today as a result of human 
interference in the environment. 
Nonetheless, the aggregate product of 
Kimmins' work is truly a breath of fresh air. 
He urges us to accept the inevitability of the 
harvesting of the forest while exhorting those 
in public office and in the forest industry itself 
to accept that adherence to a sound policy of 
forest development is in everyone's best inter- 
est. 'The time has come," he declares,"to 
leave the rhetoric behind and to move on to 
find ways by which we can actually achieve 
the conservation and sustainable use of forest 
resources that most people want." (8) Kim- 
mins is adamant that cooperation is the means 
to this end, for "[tlhe environment is far too 
important ... to go on arguing about.. . All sides 
in the forestry/environmental debate must en- 
ter a partnership to ensure sustainable devel- 
opment." (234) It is undoubtedly the hope of 
any reader of Balancing Act that the author's 
final plea will be realized. 
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Dennis Klinck's work is an addition to a new 
and exciting field of legal analysis that applies 
the theories and techniques of literary criti- 
cism and linguistics to the language of law. It 
explores this difficult and controversial area 
in what the author terms a "pragmatic" way: 
by reproducing frameworks of analysis from 
other fields, commenting on some of their 
limitations, and then attempting to apply them 
to legal language or thought processes. 
Klinck's originality lies, perhaps, in his heav- 
ily theoretical emphasis, as he attempts to go 
far beyond the general introductions and ap- 
plications of theory found in other textbooks 
in the area. Also, he avoids subscribing solely 
to the views of any particular school of lin- 
guistic or literary analysis, and, subject to 
some criticisms to be discussed later, makes a 
substantial contribution to the field. 
The more exciting sections of Klinck's 
work are the discussions of "Language and 
Thought" (Chapter 2); "Rhetoric" (Chapter 
6); and "Narrative" (Chapter 9). In the first of 
these chapters Klinck summarizes theories 
that call into question the possibility of lan- 
guage describing, or otherwise being tied in 
anyway to reality: notably those of Ferdinand 
de Saussure. These theories see language as 
arbitrary in its connection of "signs" (terms 
used to name things, relations, etc.), with ob- 
jects in the real world. Signs, as the founda- 
tions of our language and thought, can be seen 
as independent of any external reality, creat- 
ing a self-sufficient universe, unconnected 
with the world they pretend to describe. 
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In discussing these theories, Klinck rejects 
extreme formulations of linguistic relativism 
in favour of the more moderate position of 
Benjamin Lee Whorf. Whorf accepts the ex- 
istence of a reality external to language, yet 
nonetheless argues that this reality is such a 
"kaleidoscopic flux of impressions" that we 
need, and have constructed, our language to 
divide it up and organize it in ways compre- 
hensible to us. The implications of his theory 
are that a particular language will determine 
our perceptions of the world and also limit the 
possible ways in which we can think. Thus, 
Klinck posits that the form and content of 
much of Western philosophy may have been 
determined by the limits of the particular lan- 
guage in which it was created. Hence each of 
these philosophies may not be capable of cre- 
ating 'general laws' about the world. 
It is interesting that even though Klinck 
discusses the European nature of our linguis- 
tic world view, he does not make the connec- 
tion between its limited cognitive framework 
and the inability of law to comprehend or deal 
with different linguistic systems and their dif- 
ferent cultures. He could have explored an 
obvious example of a clash between unrelated 
linguistic and cultural systems that is cur- 
rently of great interest to legal scholarship: the 
problems created in imposing the European- 
based Canadian legal system, with its corre- 
sponding world view, on First Nations people 
(illustrated, for example, in 'our' differing 
conceptions of land ownership). 
In applying Whorf's theories to law, Den- 
nis Klinck also reveals that legal language 
may be a means of social regulation, organiz- 
ing and representing the world in a particular 
manner. And the caution for lawyers is that 
this linguistic determinism cuts both ways: 
just as normal language may constrain our 
breadth of thought, the language of law can 
limit our ability to perceive the world around 
us. This theoretical perspective provided by 
linguistic determinism could be extended to 
shed light on the significance of gendered 
language. Klinck shies away from any discus- 
sion of class-based control of legal discourse 
- only briefly mentioning the 'power rela- 
tion' theories of the Marxist linguistic analysis 
employed by Rossi-Landi - despite the in- 
creasing recognition of the importance of this 
kind of analysis by other legal scholars. 
In his exploration of "Rhetoric: Structures 
of Argument and Discourse" (Chapter 6), 
Klinck posits that law is not a "logical" disci- 
pline (its basic postulates being values rather 
than empirically verifiable facts), and argues 
that it is more appropriately identified as be- 
ing one of "rhetoric." He expands the defini- 
tion of "rhetoric" to include all things that can 
be considered under the label of "the art - or 
arts - of persuasion" (specifically rejecting 
the limited, negative definitions of rhetoric as 
being "verbal trickery"). Once within this 
broadlv defined field of rhetoric. Klinck takes 
us through two major frameworks of linguis- 
tic analysis: that used by classical rhetori- 
cians, inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, 
and pronunciatio; and that used by Chaim 
Perelman, with "Argumentation" being seen 
to be made up of competing processes of 
"Association" and "Dissociation." His pur- 
pose here is to reveal how all legal arguments, 
from the oral submissions of counsel to a 
judge's decision, can be dissected with these 
frameworks. And by doing so he demonstrates 
the weaknesses of reasoning found in some 
legal texts, even to the point of showing that 
the force of supposedly 'logical' arguments 
may be entirely dependent upon emotional 
con tent. 
Amore perceptive criticism of law brought 
out by Klinck's study of rhetoric is that it 
slavishly adheres to the "principle of inertia," 
the principle that a person wishing to change 
an existing practice must shoulder the burden 
of justifying that change. This principle has 
been formalized in the legal use of precedent, 
and can be illustrated by the way lawyers 
arguing a case invariably try to justify their 
own positions as being more in line with 
established practice (and the opponent's posi- 
tion as being divergent). 
Chapter 9, "Narrative," follows up on 
Klinck's comments on the relation of lan- 
guage to reality, showing that narrative struc- 
tures always represent are-telling of any event 
and are never devoid of subjectivity. This 
analysis is applied to judgments (as a type of 
narrative), and parts of judgments, such as 
'objective'judicial summaries of the 'facts' of 
a case. Factual summaries, representing a se- 
lective presentation of some of the evidence 
heard by a court, are non-objective, and are 
more accurately analyzed as forms of rhetoric 
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(the purpose of persuasion here being the 
'justness' of the judicial conclusion). The  
most  innovative demonstration of  the 
relevance of narrative analysis t o  legal 
theory i s  Klinck's inclusion of an entire 
case summary, and his subsequent dissec- 
tion of it into its narrative elements. This 
is  a clear and persuasive method of pres- 
entation, and its more frequent use could 
have helped create a greater degree of 
"intensity," for the rest of  the text. 
Klinck also examines the relevance of nar- 
rative analysis to law in general, by discussing 
the possibile interpretation of precedent as a 
narrative convention of law: that all like sto- 
ries must have like endings. He discusses 
theories that see "archetypal stories" as lying 
behind all narratives (which would justify our 
practice of distilling a case into its archetypal 
meanings for use as a precedent). These con- 
trasting positions of 'archetypal' and 'con- 
crete'underlie the dichotomy in legal thinking 
between, the demand for application of gen- 
eralizing rules, and the demand for distin- 
guishing these rules based upon the specific 
facts of each case. By examining the effective- 
ness of methods for presenting narratives, 
whether in legal writing or witness testimony, 
Klinck gives us yet another set of tools to 
control (or understand the control of), a legal 
explication of reality. 
Unfortunately, The Word of the Law, as a 
text, has some substantial problems. Suppos- 
edly written as an "introduction" to the area, 
Klinck's work shows very little sympathy for 
the new reader in the field. It contains far too 
much jargon and technical terminology, and 
poorly differentiates between the use of the 
same term by different schools of theory. It 
generally suffers from: "unjustifiable sub- 
stantive complexity" (too much material ex- 
tranious to the author's argument), and an 
overall lack of "intensity." In short, it may 
quickly discourage all but the most persistent 
of readers. Although Klinck's The Word of the 
Law is a substantial contribution to the study 
of the relationship of law and language, it 
suffers from the major failure, ironically, of 
being written in a style that hinders commu- 
nication. 
David S. Berry 
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There has been a debate within the academic 
community regarding the viability of "re- 
gional" history as a means of understanding 
and interpreting Canada's past. Though the 
days are gone when history was a narrative of 
the "grand scheme" of things, there is still a 
tendency to view Canada's history as the sum 
of its parts. Among those countering this trend 
are scholars in Atlantic Canada who have been 
generating a rich and varied regional histori- 
ography which speaks not only to "locals," 
but to people outside the region as well. 
Evidence that aspects of Canadian history 
on the periphery have been overlooked in the 
"Upper Canadian stew" can be found in the 
way in which historians view the arrival of the 
United Empire Loyalists into what is now 
Ontario and Nova Scotia. Often not con- 
sidered are the cases of Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick, where Loyalists were not the first 
wave of migrants to arrive from the former 
British Colonies to the south. 
Planters predated Loyalists by roughly 
twenty years, yet Canadian history studies 
often give them little notice. However more 
than the Loyalists, the Planters, along with the 
Micmac, Acadians and German Protestants, 
defined Nova Scotian society and set the tone 
for Nova Scotia's response to the 1867 union. 
Revising notions about the extent of Loyalist 
influence across regional boundaries is  
among the work being done by scholars in the 
field of Planter Studies. 
Indicative of how certain groups have 
been obscured by history -and historians - 
is that the term Planter must be defined. After 
the expulsion of the Acadians in 1755, efforts 
were made to "repopulate" the fertile dyke- 
lands they left behind. Between 1759 and 
1768, the Planters, approximately 8000 emi- 
grants from New England, came to "plant" 
settlements throughout the Annapolis Valley 
of Nova Scotia. As well, they tried to trans- 
plant the political, social and economic struc- 
ture of eighteenthcentury New England to 
colonial Nova Scotia. 
They Planted Well: New England Planters 
in Maritime Canada, published in 1988, con- 
tained the proceedings from the first confer- 
